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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most states in the world grant the right to vote in political elections to some people who 
do not live in the state’s territory (and possibly never have done or never will). Non-
residents are allowed to cast their vote from abroad in 115 out of 214 countries of the 
world.
2
 Furthermore, the uptake of such rights is sometimes substantial. For instance, 
about 2.6 million non-residents were eligible to vote from abroad in Italy’s 2006 
parliamentary elections and about 1.1 million actually voted, constituting 2.6 per cent of 
all ballots cast. Such extraterritorial voting rights are sometimes commended for 
acknowledging the realities of globalization and human mobility across borders. A 
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 Carlos Navarro Fierro, Isabel Morales and Maria Gratschew, ‘External voting: a comparative 
overview’, Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007), pp.11-34, at p. 11. The figure includes 
autonomous territories. 
 2 
member of the Italian parliament elected in the ‘Africa-Asia-Oceania-Antarctica’ 
constituency hailed them as a form of ‘global citizenship.’3 Cosmopolitans, however, 
are more likely to approve of the general principle of extraterritorial voting rights than 
of the reasons why some individuals enjoy them and others do not. As Rainer Bauböck 
has noted,
4
 extraterritorial voting rights are usually justified with reference to ethnic-
nationalist arguments, and states reserve them for ‘nationals’, i.e. people with a 
privileged legal status that is usually acquired through descent from another national 
and, less commonly, by being born in the state or through a naturalization procedure. 
 But what reasons would be more congenial to cosmopolitan sensibilities? 
Cosmopolitans (and not only they) often believe that people who are significantly 
affected by a policy decision should have an opportunity to influence that decision. This 
‘all-affected principle’ arguably requires the extension of participatory entitlements 
beyond the circle of resident and non-resident nationals, to include also those who are 
neither residents nor nationals but are nevertheless significantly affected by the policy 
decisions of the state.  
However, it is also true that most residents are likely to be affected more directly and 
intensely by the decisions of any particular state than most non-residents. Despite 
growing global interdependence, jurisdictional boundaries still constrain the ability of a 
state to get hold of people and coerce them into obeying its laws and paying taxes. 
Interpretations of the all-affected principle that are sensitive to differences in 
affectedness thus suggest that it would be wrong to grant participatory entitlements to 
non-residents on the same footing as residents. This creates a conundrum: if the all-
affected principle is regarded as a valid basis for assigning participatory entitlements to 
individuals, how should those entitlements be distributed in a world where jurisdictional 
boundaries between states matter in determining patterns of affectedness – but only to 
some extent? 
This article presents a solution to this conundrum. The solution is called ‘fuzzy 
citizenship’, and consists in an approach to the democratization of the global order that 
                                                 
3 Simone Battiston and Bruno Mascitelli, ‘The challenges to democracy and citizenship 
surrounding the vote to Italians overseas’, Modern Italy, 13 (2008), 261-280 at p. 274. 
4
 Rainer Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political participation: a normative 
evaluation of external voting’, Fordham Law Review, 75 (2007), 2393-2447. 
 3 
does not place direct constraints on what states can or should do (the ‘output’ side of 
state action) but changes the set of people to whom they owe participatory entitlements 
(the ‘input’ side). Fuzzy citizenship has the following key features: (a) it is based on 
territorial jurisdictions with authority over a broad or almost unlimited set of issues – 
most importantly, on states as they exist today; (b) participatory entitlements with 
regard to the decision-making process of those jurisdictions are accorded to all those 
who are likely to be causally affected by any possible decision under any possible 
agenda,
5
 rather than only to individuals with a privileged legal relationship to the 
jurisdiction (nationals) or those formally bound to comply with policy decisions because 
of their presence on the territory (residents); (c) participatory entitlements vary 
depending on the likelihood that decisions will have a significant impact on the interests 
of individuals;
6
 (d) since the likelihood of significant impact can only be determined on 
the basis of the resources controlled by jurisdictions, rather than on the basis of the 
content of possible decisions, jurisdictions that control a larger stock of resources 
should be obliged to grant more say to extraterritorial voters than jurisdictions that 
control a smaller stock of resources. These features can be institutionally realized in a 
number of ways, the simplest of which is the following: the legislature of each state 
should grant voting power to representatives elected by all non-residents in proportion 
to the share of world income under the control of that state. While this is not the only 
institutional reform that could realize fuzzy citizenship, its relative simplicity makes it a 
useful point of reference for the discussion that follows. An important caveat is that this 
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 This formulation of the all-affected principle stems from Robert Goodin and is discussed 
below in section III. Robert E. Goodin, ‘Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (2007), 40-68. 
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 The fuzzy citizenship approach is therefore based on the proportionality principle: see Harry 
Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey, ‘Democracy and proportionality’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 18 (2010), 137-155. ‘Proportional citizenship’ could be another suitable descriptor 
for the institutional arrangements proposed here. On the tension between ‘numerical equality’ 
and ‘proportional equality’ see Sofia Näsström, ‘Democracy counts: problems of equality in 
transnational democracy’, Transnational Actors in Global Governance, ed. C. Jönsson and J. 
Tallberg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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article addresses only the desirability of this institutional innovation and does not 
discuss the conditions under which it may become politically feasible.
7
 
The article is organized as follows. Section I presents the proposal in greater detail. 
Section II justifies the proposal by showing how it addresses problems of 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in light of the all-affected principle. Section 
III compares fuzzy citizenship with other blueprints for global institutional reform – 
world federalism, global stakeholder democracy, and ‘functional, overlapping and 
competing jurisdictions’ – and examines their relative ability to reduce 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.   
 
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF FUZZY CITIZENSHIP 
 
Over forty years ago, Robert Dahl examined the maxim ‘Everyone who is affected by 
the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government’ 
and noted that, for all its problems, it ‘is very likely the best general principle of 
inclusion that you are likely to find’.8 Various issues and problems raised by Dahl in 
relation to that maxim have since been discussed and elaborated, and new arguments 
relating to the all-affected principle have been developed. However, one remark made 
by Dahl has generated little discussion: the all-affected interests principle ‘forces us to 
ask whether there is not some wisdom in the half serious comment of a friend in Latin 
America who said that his people should be allowed to participate in our elections, for 
what happens in the politics of the United States is bound to have profound 
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 For general discussions on the empirical feasibility of global democratization see Mathias 
Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Is global democracy possible?’, European Journal of International 
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democracy and domestic analogies’, Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical 
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Theory 2 (2010), 175–209. 
8
 Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970), p. 64. 
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consequences for his country.’ Dahl added: ‘Do not dismiss his jest as an absurdity. In a 
world where we all have a joint interest in survival, the real absurdity is the absence of 
any system of government where that joint interest is effectively represented.’9  
Perhaps the lack of attention towards Dahl’s remark is due to the fact that, as Robert 
Goodin has noted, by labelling it ‘half-serious’ it was left ‘hovering uneasily in that 
infamous argumentational no-man’s land between QED and reductio [ad absurdum]’.10 
This article aims at rescuing it from that unfortunate condition. 
The possibility of granting some form of representation for extraterritorial interests in 
state institutions has not completely been ignored since Dahl wrote those words. 
Philippe Schmitter proposed a system called ‘reciprocal representation’, whereby states 
that are highly interdependent accord each other a number of seats – perhaps two or 
three – in their respective national legislative chambers.11 The reciprocal representatives 
would have the right to speak on the floor and, in time, possibly acquire the right to 
vote. For Schmitter, such an arrangement would be especially desirable and acceptable 
in the case of neighbouring countries and members of free trade areas such as NAFTA 
and MERCOSUL. From the point of view of the all-affected principle, a crucial 
limitation of the proposal is that cross-national affectedness is often radically 
asymmetric. For instance, citizens of Nicaragua are significantly more affected by 
policies decided by the U.S. government than U.S. citizens are affected by Nicaraguan 
policies. An institutional blueprint that does not take such asymmetries into account is 
unlikely to make substantial progress towards realizing the all-affected principle. 
More recently, a very weak form of ‘external representation’ has been proposed by 
David Miller for cases in which a state is considering a coercive policy that would have 
external impacts.
12
 Miller suggests that before the decision is taken, representatives of 
other states that will feel the impact of the decision should be invited to put their case to 
the legislature of the first state, without the right to vote on the decision. While 
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 Dahl, After the Revolution? p. 67. 
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 Goodin, ‘Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives’, at p. 64. 
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 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Exploring the problematic triumph of liberal democracy and 
concluding with a modest proposal for improving its international impact’, Democracy’s Victory 
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attractive compared to the status quo, such an arrangement is unlikely to satisfy the all-
affected principle. 
The remainder of this section presents the basic features of a more extensive and 
intensive form of external representation – fuzzy citizenship – while the next section 
examines why and how those features can satisfy the all-affected principle under the 
conditions of partial and asymmetric interdependence that pervade the world today. 
Fuzzy citizenship has five main features, which will be presented in turn.  
 1. Entities that owe participatory entitlements. In contrast to other proposals for 
global democratization that focus on specialized and nongovernmental organizations 
(see section IV), fuzzy citizenship applies primarily to decision-making units that 
combine two features: they are able to exercise effective authority over a territory in a 
way that is ultimately backed by coercive capabilities; and their authority applies to a 
wide and possibly open-ended range of policy issues. A number of entities possess 
those features at least to some extent, notably provinces in federal states and the 
European Union. But they most clearly characterize states as we know them today. 
Therefore, while the proposal may be extended to every multifunctional decision-
making unit endowed with coercive authority, in the interest of simplicity the remainder 
of this article refers to ‘states’.   
Furthermore, I assume that within each state it is possible to identify an organ that 
has the twin function of taking fundamental decisions on how to use the authority of the 
state and of ‘representing’ those who are subject to that authority. While such organs 
have many different names, they are called ‘legislatures’ here. The following discussion 
skips over the diversity of ways in which legislative powers are exercised in existing 
states – e.g. bicameralism, the role of the executive in legislation, constitutional review 
of statutory legislation by the judiciary, and so on – and instead is based on a stylized 
account of how regulative and allocative policy decisions are made within state 
jurisdictions.  
One question needs to be addressed now, however. Most existing legislatures claim 
to represent ‘the people’, but in many cases this ‘representation’ is arguably far from 
satisfying minimal standards of democracy. Any proposal that advocates some kind of 
extraterritorial representation thus faces an obvious problem: what should be done about 
legislatures that do not provide adequate democratic representation even for ‘insiders’? 
 7 
There are at least two possible answers to this question. The first answer is that 
participating legislatures must be fully democratic, and specifically be legitimized by 
free and fair elections, before the idea of extending the circle of represented interests 
can even be entertained. This could be called a ‘thick’ version of extraterritorial 
representation. This position could entail either that the establishment of a global system 
of extraterritorial representation must wait until all states have become democracies, or 
alternatively that existing democracies should accord participatory rights to each other’s 
citizens and progressively include the citizens of other states as they become 
democratic. The second possible answer is that nondemocratic forms of political 
representation are compatible with external representation: it would suffice that in each 
legislature the affected extraterritorial interests are represented according to the same 
(democratic or nondemocratic) standards as nationals.
13
 This would be a ‘thin’ version 
of external representation. Since the fuzzy citizenship approach is rooted in the all-
affected principle, which is generally interpreted as a foundational principle of 
democracy, it is naturally close to the thick version. However, it is compatible with a 
distinction between a transitional phase, during which various forms of political 
representation coexist, and a steady-state phase, which is reached when democratic 
representation is all-pervasive.   
 2. Beneficiaries of participatory entitlements. Under a fuzzy citizenship regime, 
participatory entitlements with regard to the selection of members of state legislatures 
are to be extended well beyond the circle of individuals with a privileged legal 
relationship to the state (‘nationals’) or those formally bound to comply with legislative 
decisions because of their presence on the territory (‘residents’). Participatory 
entitlements should be accorded to anyone who is likely to be significantly affected by 
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 On the issue of nondemocratic standards of valid political representation see Andrew Rehfeld, 
‘Towards a general theory of political representation’, Journal of Politics, 68 (2006), 1–21. On 
the issue of non-electoral standards of valid democratic representation see Terry Macdonald, 
Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation beyond Liberal States (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) and Michael Saward, ‘Authorisation and authenticity: 
representation and the unelected’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 17 (2009), 1–22.  
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any possible decision taken under any possible agenda.
14
 Since individuals can be 
affected by the exercise of state power in a myriad of specific causal relationships that 
transcend territorial borders, this expansive ‘affectedness’ criterion means that some 
form of ‘citizenship’ (understood as political status entailing participatory rights) may 
have to be expanded well beyond anything so far contemplated even by the states with 
the most generous and inclusive citizenship admission policies.  
3. Full and partial citizenship. Under a fuzzy citizenship regime, citizenship ceases 
to be an all-or-nothing affair. Individuals can be full citizens or fully non-citizens, but 
also partial citizens of a state. A useful way to think about this revised conception of 
citizenship is in terms of fuzzy-set logic, which was first proposed by Lofti Zadeh and 
later developed by many scholars.
15
 The key feature of fuzzy sets is that they embody 
both qualitative states, i.e. full membership and full nonmembership in a set, and 
variation by level, i.e. degrees of membership between 0 and 1. This feature has made 
the approach fruitful in a number of disciplines, such as mathematical logic, computer 
science, engineering, medicine, and the social sciences.
16
 The basic idea can also be 
applied to normative and legal concepts such as citizenship. Thinking in terms of fuzzy 
sets is especially useful when observers of a certain property in a number of elements 
can identify one or two thresholds. There is a lower threshold when it makes sense to 
differentiate elements on the basis of the degree to which they possess that property 
when the value of the property is above that threshold but not when it is below. 
Elements that are below the threshold can be all considered fully out the relevant set, 
whereas elements that are above the threshold are either partially or fully in the set. 
Conversely, there is a higher threshold when it makes sense to differentiate elements on 
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 This formula is based on Goodin, ‘Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives’. 
Section III of this article elaborates on its implications. 
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 Lofti Zadeh, ‘Fuzzy sets’, Information and Control, 8 (1965), 338-353. 
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 See for instance Senén Barro and Roque Marin (eds), Fuzzy Logic in Medicine (Heidelberg: 
Physica-Verlag, 2002); John Harris, Fuzzy Logic Applications in Engineering Science 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006); Charles Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000); Terry D. Clark, Jennifer M. Larson, John N. Mordeson, Joshua D. Potter 
and Mark J. Wierman, Applying Fuzzy Mathematics to Formal Models in Comparative Politics 
(Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2008). 
 9 
the basis of the degree to which they possess that property when the value of the 
property is below that threshold but not when it is above. Elements that are above the 
threshold can be all considered fully in the relevant set, whereas elements that are below 
the threshold are either partially or fully out the set.  
This reasoning can be applied to the problem at hand. The relevant property of 
individuals is the likelihood of being affected by decisions taken by a given state 
(affectedness, for short). A threshold is given by the circumstance that some individuals, 
by virtue of their being residents on the territory of the state, are ‘subject’ to its direct 
and coercion-backed authority. Such individuals are equally entitled to ‘full’ citizenship, 
i.e. to full and equal participatory entitlements. By contrast, non-residents may be 
‘affected’ by but not ‘subjected’ to the authority of a state, and this justifies partial 
citizenship, i.e. participatory entitlements that are weaker than those associated with full 
citizenship.
17
 But how much weaker should they be? In other words, what degree of 
citizenship should states grant to non-residents? This question is addressed next.
18
 
                                                 
17
 Also Bruno Frey advocates a form of ‘partial citizenship’, as well as ‘multiple citizenship’, 
but he conceptualizes it in a fundamentally different way. Frey’s partial citizenship would allow 
an individual to be a citizen of a political unit with respect to one particular function and a 
citizen of another political unit with respect to other functions; Frey’s multiple citizenship 
would involve splitting up the citizenship of persons simultaneously working and living in 
different countries. See Bruno S. Frey, ‘Flexible government for a globalized world’, Global 
Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives. The general topic of ‘global citizenship’ is 
analysed by Luis Cabrera, The Practice of Global Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
18
 In addition to the fact that, as noted in the introduction, most states of the world allow 
extraterritorial voting, it may be of interest that some states establish de facto differential voting 
rights for resident and non-resident voters. In Croatia, France, Italy, Portugal, Algeria, Angola, 
Cape Verde, Mozambique, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, the votes of citizens abroad are not 
added to the votes of resident citizens, but used to elect special representatives with reserved 
parliamentary seats. See Navarro Fierro et al. ‘External voting’, at p. 28. The proportion of seats 
reserved for expatriate representatives as a percentage of total seats in parliamentary assemblies 
ranges from 0.6% (in Colombia) to 8.3% (in Cape Verde). The effect of such arrangements is 
usually that the ‘weight’ of the votes of expatriates is significantly lower than the weight of 
residents’ votes. In the 2006 elections for the lower chamber of the Italian parliament, for 
 10 
 4. Criteria for extraterritorial representation. Under a fuzzy citizenship regime, the 
degree of citizenship that states should grant to non-subjects varies from state to state. 
The likelihood that a non-subject will be affected by a state’s decision - any possible 
decision taken under any possible agenda – depends primarily on the resources that are 
controlled by that state. Hence, non-subjects should be granted relatively high degrees 
of partial citizenship by resource-rich states, and relatively low degrees of partial 
citizenship by resource-poor states. In short, extraterritorial participatory entitlements 
should be proportional to the resources controlled by the state. 
It is possible that some kinds of resources are unlikely to have an impact on non-
subjects, whatever decision is taken about their use. What kind of resources should enter 
in the calculation?
19
 A first step towards answering this question consists in the 
distinction between fungible resources, which are convertible into one another in the 
short or long run, and resources that are strictly not convertible. Fungible resources 
include tangible assets such as land, natural resources, factories, infrastructure, goods, 
weapons, etc, as well as intangible assets such as skills and ‘social capital’. Ideally, all 
fungible resources should be included in the calculation of extraterritorial participatory 
entitlements, since decisions on whether and how to convert them are likely to affect all 
non-subjects. This is because even if the current form of the resource cannot affect 
them, a ‘converted’ form probably would. By contrast, strictly nonfungible resources do 
not necessarily affect non-subjects, or affect only a subset of them, which suggests that 
their likely effect would need to be considered case by case. However, since the set of 
strictly non-fungible resources is small and possibly empty, this issue will not 
considered further here. 
Considering that the set of fungible resources is very heterogeneous, how should the 
various categories be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the proportion of votes 
that states should assign to extraterritorial constituencies, i.e. to partial citizens? 
                                                                                                                                               
instance, there was one parliamentary seat for every 76,171 eligible electors voting in Italy, and 
one parliamentary seat for every 225,615 eligible electors voting abroad (own calculations 
based on Ministero dell’Interno, Archivio storico delle elezioni, http://elezionistorico.interno.it). 
As voter turnout was significantly higher in Italy than abroad, the difference between 
seats/voters ratios was substantially lower than the difference between seats/electors ratios. 
19
 I am grateful to Robert Goodin for highlighting important issue. 
 11 
Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to this question. One possible solution 
consists in focusing on the most ‘fungible’ kind of resource, which is probably national 
‘income’ as captured by GDP. This shortcut would allow the application of very general 
rules, such as the rule that, in the legislature of each state, the percentage of seats for 
extraterritorially elected representatives should relate to the percentage of world GDP 
under the control of that state, taking into account what proportion of world population 
is already made up by full citizens of that state.
20
 
To be sure, several other calculation methods are plausible. Researchers of the 
Correlates of War project have created a Composite Index of National Capability, which 
is computed by summing all observations on each of six capability components (total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military 
personnel, and military expenditure), converting each state's absolute component to a 
share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components. One 
limitation of this index is that it does not capture an important aspect of material 
capability such as the possession of nuclear weapons, although it is plausible to 
maintain that the other components are correlated with the potential possession of 
nuclear weapons in the future, which would be consistent with the argument about 
fungible resources developed earlier. Another limitation of an index of material 
capabilities is, of course, that it does not include intangible and ideational resources, 
                                                 
20
 One possible formula could be: Se/Sj = (GDPj/GDPw)·(POPw-POPj)/POPw, where Se/Sj is the 
ratio of extraterritorial seats over total seats in the legislature of state j,  GDPj is the gross 
domestic product of j, GDPw is the world’s gross domestic product, POPj is the population 
residing in j, and POPw is total world population. For illustration, the following table provides 
calculations for two large rich countries, a large poor country, a small rich country and a small 
poor country, in 2009 (data from World Development Indicators). 
 GDPj/GDPw (POPw-POPj)/POPw Se/Sj    (% of seats) 
USA 0.284 0.955 0.271  (27.1%) 
Japan 0.123 0.981 0.121  (12.1%)  
India 0.022 0.829 0.018  (1.8%) 
Sweden 0.0071 0.9986 0.0071  (0.7%) 
Costa Rica 0.0006 0.9992 0.0006  (0.0%) 
 
 12 
although also in this case an argument about correlation between material and ideational 
resources could be made. 
While the question of how to operationalize the principle of proportionality between 
resources and extraterritorial votes would inevitably be the subject to debate and 
contestation, the next section will argue that the principle itself is an appropriate way of 
realizing the all affected principle in a world of uneven interdependence. 
21
 
 5. Constitutional decisions. Decisions that concern the basic rules and functioning of 
the fuzzy citizenship regime require special procedures. These decisions include which 
resources should enter into the calculation of extraterritorial participatory entitlements, 
the formula according to which resources are translated into seats, and how to assess 
whether states have correctly applied the rules about extraterritorial representation. 
Everyone in the world would be affected by such ‘constitutional’ decisions in equal 
degree, and hence everyone should have an equal chance to participate in taking them. 
The most straightforward way of implementing this requirement is to create a global 
assembly whose members are either elected directly by citizens around the world or are 
chosen by state legislatures. Since such a body would be concerned only with settling 
constitutional questions and ensuring the proper functioning of the regime, it may 
convene only occasionally on the basis of need.   
 
 
III. JUSTIFICATION OF FUZZY CITIZENSHIP 
 
The introduction stated that fuzzy citizenship would provide a way of realizing the all-
affected principle in a situation in which jurisdictional boundaries between states 
determine patterns of affectedness, but only to some extent. This section aims at 
substantiating this assertion. 
The principle that people who are significantly affected by a policy decision should 
have an opportunity to influence that decision underlies a range of diagnoses of political 
legitimacy under conditions of global interdependence. For instance, David Held argued 
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 External representatives may be excluded from voting on decisions that pertain only very 
weakly and indirectly to a state’s use of scarce resources, for instance on traffic regulations. 
 13 
that globalization undermines a key assumption of traditional democratic thought: the 
assumption of a ‘symmetrical’ and ‘congruent’ relationship between ‘decision-makers’ 
and ‘decision-takers’. Democracy is challenged by ‘the divergence that sometimes 
exists between the totality of those affected by a political decision and those who 
participated in making it (however indirectly) within a democratic state’22. 
Diagnoses of this kind are often based, implicitly or explicitly, on some version of 
the all-affected principle. The principle itself has deep roots in history. The formula 
‘Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur’ (what affects all should be approved by 
all), which is found in Justinian’s Code, was first used in a constitutional rather than 
private law sense in the thirteenth century, most famously in the writ by King Edward I 
of England that summoned the bishops and abbots to the so-called Model Parliament of 
1295
23
. Most generally, the principle can mean that those affected have a veto on the 
decision (a literal reading of Justinian’s formula); or that they are entitled to a vote (a 
weaker version already accepted in medieval theory and practice); or that they are 
entitled to voice, i.e. to be heard in a genuinely deliberative process. In this article, I 
assume that the principle is about voting rights, although many of the arguments 
presented here also apply to an interpretation stressing the right to express views and 
concerns in the context of a deliberative process leading to a decision.  
As noted above, recent discussions of the principle owe much to the influence of 
Dahl. It has been invoked by other prominent political theorists, e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 
who stated that ‘[d]eficits in democratic legitimation arise whenever the set of those 
involved in making democratic decisions fails to coincide with the set of those affected 
by them.’24  Important recent defences of the principle have been presented by Ian 
Shapiro and Robert Goodin.
25
 Jeremy Waldron has gone as far as describing the 
principle ‘what touches all should be decided by all’ as ‘entirely unexceptionable’.26 
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 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), at p. ix. 
23
Gaines Post, 'A Roman legal theory of consent, quod omnes tangit, in medieval representation', 
Wisconsin Law Review 1950 (1950), 66-78. 
24
 Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), at p. 78, emphasis 
removed. 
25
 Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Ian Shapiro, The 
Moral Foundations of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Goodin, 
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The all-affected principle is useful to the extent that it provides a general criterion for 
assessing existing and hypothetical institutional arrangements. In order to perform this 
function, the principle needs to be disaggregated into more specific criteria. A first 
relevant distinction is between the ability of institutional arrangements to reduce 
‘underinclusiveness’ and their ability to reduce ‘overinclusiveness’. Moreover, 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness can themselves be broken up into more 
specific concepts and criteria.  
The likelihood that an institutional arrangement will be underinclusive depends to a 
significant extent on how the all-affected principle is understood. Goodin has probably 
provided the most expansive, and also most coherent and cogent, interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives’. For a discussion of the principle and 
further references to works that refer to it see Sofia Näsström, ‘The challenge of the all-affected 
principle’, Political Studies, Article first published online on 10 June 2010. The relationship of 
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26
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everyone it affects’, European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2006), 433-458; Raffaele 
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include the exclusive control over resources beyond what is necessary to keep out of poverty. 
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principle: a say should be given to anyone who might possibly be affected by any 
possible decision arising out of any possible agenda, and not just those who are actually 
affected by the course of action actually decided upon.
27
 He also notes that the logical 
implication of this interpretation may well be that virtually everyone in the world should 
be entitled to vote on any proposal or any proposal for proposals. The risk that any 
institutional arrangement may fail to reach this demanding standard and produce 
underinclusiveness is clearly very high.  
Goodin’s formula is particularly useful because the distinction between specific 
decisions and agendas allows us to introduce a distinction between two kinds of 
underinclusiveness. One kind consists of being excluded from making decisions on a 
predetermined set of options. The other kind consists of being excluded from decisions 
on what options should be decided upon. Of the two kinds of underclusiveness – which 
can be called ‘option-underinclusiveness’ and ‘agenda-underinclusiveness’ respectively 
– the latter is arguably the most fundamental, and it violates one of the basic criteria for 
democracy stressed by Dahl: ‘The members must have the exclusive opportunity to 
decide how and, if they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda.’28 In 
practice, agenda-underinclusiveness is much more likely than option-
underinclusiveness: most people may not be affected by any of the options that actually 
are on the table in any given decision-making situation, but may well be affected by 
options that might hypothetically be placed on the table.   
The second criterion for assessing institutional designs is their ability to reduce 
overinclusiveness. Again, we can distinguish between two types of overinclusiveness. 
One type occurs whenever someone who is not affected by a decision is allowed to take 
part in making it. This can be called ‘absolute’ overinclusiveness. How serious is the 
risk of absolute overinclusiveness? It appears remote for any institutional arrangement 
that aims to realize Goodin’s most expansive interpretation, i.e. to secure the inclusion 
of anyone who might possibly be affected by any possible decision arising out of any 
possible agenda. Goodin himself, however, notes that a somewhat different and more 
defensible interpretation, which requires the inclusion of anyone who might probably 
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 Goodin, ‘Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives’. 
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 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), at p. 38. 
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(as opposed to possibly) be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible 
agenda, reduces the expansionary implications of the all-affected principle. This is the 
interpretation adopted in this article.
29
 
The second type of overinclusiveness can be called ‘relative’ overinclusiveness. If 
absolute overinclusiveness occurs whenever someone not affected by a decision is 
allowed to take part in making it, relative overinclusiveness occurs whenever someone 
who is (probably) less affected by a decision is included in the same way and to the 
same extent as someone who is (probably) more affected by it. A way to express 
differences in the degree of affectedness is the notion of an individual’s ‘stake’, which 
can be defined as ‘the pay-off difference between the better option from the individual’s 
perspective and the worse one’30 Insofar as stakes as well as participation in decision-
making are a matter of degree rather than a matter of all-or-nothing, absolute 
overinclusiveness is just a special case of relative overinclusiveness, namely a situation 
where the stake is ‘zero’ and participation is ‘full’. 
Relative overinclusiveness is related to what Dahl called the ‘problem of intensity’ in 
democratic theory, i.e. how to deal with situations in which a minority prefers an 
alternative much more ‘passionately’ than the majority prefers a different alternative. 
Dahl suggested that the failure to take into account differences in intensity, especially in 
situations where minorities with intense preferences are systematically outvoted by 
majorities with weak preferences, contravenes the principle of equal consideration and 
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respect that underpins many normative theories of democracy.
31
 Harry Brighouse and 
Marc Fleurbaey, and Terry Macdonald, have recently developed persuasive arguments 
in support of taking differences in stakes into account when allocating participatory 
entitlements.
32
  
The preceding discussion has yielded four criteria for the assessment of institutional 
designs: option-underinclusiveness, agenda-underinclusiveness, absolute 
overinclusiveness and relative overinclusiveness. The remainder of this section shows 
how fuzzy citizenship can reduce them simultaneously. 
First, fuzzy citizenship reduces underinclusiveness because it assigns participatory 
entitlements to people who are not nationals but are affected by the decisions taken by 
the relevant legislature. A critical advantage of fuzzy citizenship is that it would reduce 
not only option-underinclusiveness but also agenda-underinclusiveness. This is because 
it applies to decision-making units whose authority extends to a wide and possibly 
open-ended range of policy issues. In contrast to other entities such as 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and companies, the range of policy decisions 
that can be placed on the agenda of state legislatures is not constrained by a specialized 
‘mandate’. It is usually the case that state legislatures can legitimately place on the 
agenda any decision except those that would infringe human rights. Within this 
constraint, states are general-purpose entities that decide about the extraction of 
resources and their allocation to a wide range of tasks, as well as about setting rules for 
a variety of social domains. Therefore access to state legislatures enables individuals to 
protect a wide range of their interests rather than only those stemming from particular 
social roles.  
Second, fuzzy citizenship avoids overinclusiveness because it does not assign equal 
participatory entitlements to anyone who may possibly be affected by any possible 
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decision under any possible agenda of any state legislature. A critical advantage of 
fuzzy citizenship is that it would address relative overinclusiveness (and ipso facto 
absolute overinclusiveness). This is so because it is based on a dual set of differentiation 
criteria: one that differentiates between beneficiaries of participatory entitlements 
(people) and another that differentiates between the entities that owe such entitlements 
(states). These criteria will be considered in turn. 
With regard to the first differentiation, fuzzy citizenship avoids relative 
overinclusiveness because it recognizes that there is normally an important difference in 
likely impact between those who are directly subjected to the coercion-backed authority 
of a state (generally because they reside within the jurisdictional boundaries of that 
state) and those that are affected by its decisions in other ways. As the former are 
equally ‘subject’ to the authority of the state, they should be entitled to equal and full 
citizenship in the state. In terms of fuzzy set logic, they pass an intensity threshold of 
affectedness beyond which any further difference is irrelevant.
33
 People over whom the 
state has no authority find themselves in a different position: they may be more or less 
affected by it, but the mere fact of not being subjects of the state entitles them to less 
than full citizenship, i.e. partial citizenship.
34
  
Are there are reasons for differentiating further among those non-subjects and assign 
different degrees of partial citizenship to different categories of non-subject? Since their 
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affectedness has to be assessed in relation to any possible decision arising from any 
possible agenda, the answer is probably no: all non-subjects should be entitled to the 
same degree of partial citizenship. On the other hand, it could be argued that some non-
subjects are more affected by the decisions of a state whatever that decision might be, 
for instance because poverty or refugee status places them in a particularly vulnerable 
position. I will not pursuing this question further here, except to note that there might be 
some good reasons for distinguishing among non-subjects on the basis of general 
vulnerability.
35
 
With regard to the second differentiation mentioned above, the one relating to states, 
fuzzy citizenship reduces relative overinclusiveness because it does not impose the 
same participatory requirements on all states. As noted in the previous section, 
extraterritorial participatory entitlements should be proportional to the resources 
controlled by the state. Why this emphasis on resources? Recall the formulation of the 
all-affected proposed by Goodin: a say should be given to anyone who might probably 
be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda. In general, the 
impact of any decision depends on the content of the decision and on the resources that 
the decision-making unit could use to implement them. Of these two elements, the 
content of decisions cannot be used to determine who should have a say, because the 
content will probably depend on who has a say. Hence, the impact of decisions needs be 
determined solely on the basis of how many resources are at the disposal of the 
decision-making unit.
 36
 Non-subjects have a higher probability of being significantly 
affected by a more resourceful decision-making unit than by a less resourceful decision-
making unit. Indeed, many decision-making units, including some states, do not possess 
sufficient resources to be likely to affect any non-subjects in a significant way, whether 
beneficially or harmfully. Those units may be required to offer weak or no participatory 
entitlements to non-subjects either if the former can affect the latter significantly but 
only with a very low probability or if they can affect them with high probability but 
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insignificantly. In sum, fuzzy citizenship reduces relative overinclusiveness by linking 
the extent of extraterritorial representation in states to the probability of them having a 
significant effect, via the resources they control.
37
 
In section II, a class of decisions was singled out as requiring a special procedure 
because of their ‘constitutional’ nature. These decisions concern the basic parameters 
and workings of the fuzzy citizenship regime. It was proposed to reserve these decisions 
to a special global assembly, whose members could be either elected by all citizens or 
chosen by all state legislatures. The justification for this special arrangement is that 
everyone would be affected by these decisions, and there is no reason to expect that 
some would be more affected than others. Since by design states do not offer equal 
opportunity for influence to everybody, those constitutional decisions need to be taken 
by an ad hoc body that offers such equal opportunities. It should be noted that this 
arrangement addresses an alleged difficulty of the all-affected principle, which is that 
the problem of defining democratically who is affected and therefore entitled to vote 
produces ‘a regression from which no procedural escape is possible’.38 The institutional 
solution proposed here does not lead to such an infinite regression: since everyone is 
equally affected by the basic rules of the fuzzy citizenship regime, everyone should 
have an equal opportunity to shape them.   
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IV. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF FUZZY CITIZENSHIP 
 
Fuzzy citizenship is only one of many proposals aimed at reducing the ‘democratic 
deficit’ of global society.39 Even if the arguments presented in section III are persuasive 
and it is accepted that fuzzy citizenship would promote the realization of the all-affected 
principle, this would not necessarily mean that fuzzy citizenship is the best way of 
doing so. Such a conclusion could only stem from a comparative assessment. This 
section presents some building blocks for such a comparative assessment, with the aim 
of stimulating further analysis and debate.  
 This section cannot provide a detailed discussion of specific institutional blueprints, 
and instead it aims at identifying how general design choices are likely to affect the 
ability of the proposed institutions to minimize both underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness. From this perspective, two dimensions of institutional variation seem 
especially important. The first dimension concerns the nature of governance in general, 
and is based on the distinction between a ‘pyramidal’ type of governance in which 
various nested decision-making units have competencies over a range of issues and 
there is no or little territorial overlap among them, and a ‘polycentric’ system of 
governance in which governance units are functionally specific and have significant 
territorial overlap with one another. The second dimension relates more specifically to 
the all-affected principle and depends on whether the proposed institutional mechanisms 
require or merely allow consideration of the fact that actual or potential participants in 
transnational democratic institutions are unlikely to have equal stakes or equally intense 
preferences on all issues that are to be decided collectively. 
With regard to the first dimension, virtually no supporter of ‘transnational 
democracy’ thinks of it in terms of a centralized state. Almost all models expect 
authority to be diffused, accepting the plea by Dahl and Edward Tufte: ‘Rather than 
conceiving of democracy as located in a particular kind of inclusive, sovereign unit, we 
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must learn to conceive of democracy spreading through a set of interrelated political 
systems, sometimes but not always arranged like Chinese boxes, the smaller nesting in 
the larger’.40 However, supporters of transnational democracy disagree on whether the 
‘nestedness’ referred to by Dahl and Tufte should be the rule or the exception. Adapting 
for our purposes a typology of multilevel governance proposed by Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks,
41
 approaches to transnational democracy can be distinguished according to 
whether they envisage overlapping governance units forming a polycentric system or 
alternatively nested governance units forming a pyramidal system. In a pyramidal 
system, a range of different competencies and governance tasks are bundled in a limited 
number of jurisdictions operating at different, usually territorial ‘levels’. There is no 
overlap between these jurisdictions at each territorial level, and the units at each level 
are ‘nested’ within those at the next higher level, so that there is one and only one 
relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale. By contrast, in a polycentric 
system governance is exercised by a large number of functionally specific and 
specialized units, none of which has exclusive authority over a territory.  
The second dimension of institutional design relates to the consideration of the 
intensity of affectedness. Institutional rules can require sensitivity to variation in 
affectedness or they can merely allow it. Such variation can be accommodated even in 
institutional arrangements that do not explicitly and formally recognize their relevance. 
Theoretical and empirical work on established democratic states suggests that electoral 
incentives, by pushing elected representatives to take into account the salience of issues 
for different groups of voters, allow members of minorities to exert disproportional 
influence on the issues they most care about.
42
 Moreover, vote trading among elected 
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representatives allows for differences in preference intensity to be taken into account.
43
 
In sum, a range of political mechanisms can allow political actors to take into account 
variation in intensity even if this not required by ‘constitutional’ rules. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
 Sensitivity to intensity 
 Allowed Required 
 
Overlapping  
1 
Example: FOCJ 
2 
Example: Global Stakeholder 
Democracy 
 
Nested 
3 
Example: World federalism 
4 
Example: Fuzzy citizenship 
 
Fig. 1. Forms of transnational democracy 
 
As shown in Figure 1, these two dimensions can be used to identify four categories 
of transnational democracy models. The remainder of this section examines whether 
three prominent models of transnational democracy, which are located in cell 1, 2 and 3 
in Figure 1, might address problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness more 
effectively than fuzzy citizenship, which is located in cell 4. The three models are the 
‘functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions’, which have been proposed by 
Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; ‘global stakeholder democracy’, which has been 
proposed by Terry Macdonald; and world federalism, which has been advocated by a 
variety of authors such as, recently, Raffaele Marchetti. Some of the remarks on world 
federalism also apply to the ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ approach developed by Daniele 
Archibugi and David Held.
44
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 Two caveats should be noted. First, the authors of those models do not necessarily 
justify them with reference to some version of the all-affected principle, but may use 
different normative yardsticks. The aim of this section is not to assess how well the 
proposed institutions are likely to achieve goals set by their authors, but how and how 
well they would meet the assessment criteria outlined in the previous section. Second, 
the models have different approaches to the decision-making units that may or may not 
have to grant participatory entitlements. Some – notably global stakeholder democracy 
and fuzzy citizenship – aim mainly at ‘democratizing’ existing decision-making units. 
The task is to add participatory mechanisms to those decision-making units. Others – 
notably functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions, and world federalism – aim 
at creating new decision-making units, which would incorporate democratic 
participatory mechanisms by design. 
Frey and Eichenberger argue that significant welfare gains would ensue from 
opening the market for government services to a range of public jurisdictions that 
specialize in the provision of particular services to individual citizens or communes, 
with none of those jurisdictions monopolizing authority over a particular territory. They 
call such entities ‘FOCJ’ (Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions – the 
singular being ‘FOCUS’). They are functional in the sense that their size and 
geographical coverage are determined by the specific task to be performed, notably by 
issue-specific trade-offs between closeness to consumers and economies of scale. They 
are overlapping in the sense that the boundaries of different FOCJ do not coincide, and 
that several of them may operate in the same geographical area, providing a different or 
the same type of service. They are competitive because they incorporate two 
mechanisms of competition: citizens or communes can exit FOCJ and join others, which 
ensures market-like competition between FOCJ; and citizens or communes have voting 
rights on policy decisions and on the election of politicians and managers running the 
FOCUS, which promotes political competition within FOCJ. Finally, FOCJ are 
jurisdictions, because they have power to regulate and to tax their members. Their 
members may be either individuals or the smallest political units (‘communes’) with all 
their citizens – the choice of type of membership will depend on the type of service to 
be provided.   
 25 
How does this proposal cope with the problems of underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness, as they have been defined in the previous section? FOCJ can produce 
intrasectoral and intersectoral, positive and negative externalities. For instance, waste 
disposal through incineration generates negative environmental externalities for non-
members. This creates the potential of underinclusiveness, if members are unwilling to 
let affected outsiders participate in decisions. Recycling schemes, on the other hand, 
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and thus generate positive environmental 
externalities for non-members. This may create a different risk of underinclusiveness, as 
non-members may refuse to join the scheme in order to avoid contributing to its cost. 
FOCJ will be underinclusive whenever members are interested in externalizing costs 
and reject the inclusion of affected outsiders, and whenever outsiders are interested in 
benefiting from positive externalities and prefer not to join the FOCUS that produces 
them. This is partly due to the voluntary nature of FOCJ. But it also depends on the fact 
that FOCJ are functionally specific: since they specialize in the production of one type 
of good, various kinds of decisions are not likely to be on the agenda. This results in 
agenda-underinclusiveness. Members of a FOCUS have a say on how the resources it 
raises should be used to provide a good or service, rather than considering every 
possible use that could be made of those resources. Fuzzy citizenship is more effective 
at avoiding these problems of underinclusiveness, because full citizens do not have the 
right to exclude non-residents from (partial) citizenship, and the multifunctional nature 
of states means that full and partial citizens can decide to use the resources controlled 
by the state in any way they wish. 
Furthermore, the absence of explicit mechanism for taking the preference intensity of 
members into account exposes FOCJ to the risk of relative overinclusiveness. Frey and 
Eichenberger acknowledge that the single-issue character of FOCJ means that intense 
preferences cannot be revealed through vote trading, but they argue that intense 
preferences can be accommodated in other ways.
45
 First, members with intense 
preferences are more likely to participate in votes and elections for FOCJ positions, and 
their particularly intensive demands may be taken into account by other members. The 
problem with these informal mechanisms is that the likelihood of active participation 
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and the responsiveness of other members to one’s demands are dependent not only on 
the intensity of preferences but also on a range of other factors, and the risk is that 
structurally disadvantaged members may become disenfranchised rather than 
empowered through them. Second, Frey and Eichenberger note that ‘minorities with 
intensive preferences can establish a FOCUS designed to care for their special interests’. 
However, in some cases such separate FOCJ would forfeit economies of scale in the 
production of collective goods, and as a result a FOCUS that is more responsive to 
people with certain interests may also be less able to satisfy them. Special FOCJ for 
people with intense preferences may also increase the risk of exposing minorities to the 
externalities produced by majorities, so that relative overinclusiveness is reduced at the 
cost of creating underinclusiveness. These problems are unlikely to emerge in a fuzzy 
citizenship regime, since it incorporates a basic rule for differentiating between more 
affected and less affected people and it does not hinder vote trading as a way of taking 
into account more fine-grained differences in affectedness. 
Whereas Frey and Eichenberger are mainly concerned with the creation of new 
entities that would provide collective goods more efficiently, and give reasons why they 
should be governed democratically, Terry Macdonald’s ‘global stakeholder democracy’ 
is based on the observation that today power – crucially, power that impacts in 
problematic ways upon the capacity of individuals to lead autonomous lives – is already 
exercised not only by states but also by a variety of nonstate actors that operate across 
state borders, such as NGOs, transnational corporations and intergovernmental 
organizations. Given the existence of these decision-making units, the problem is to 
create participatory mechanisms involving groups of individuals whose autonomy is 
most deeply affected by those decision-making units. In global stakeholder democracy, 
what here is called absolute overinclusiveness could be kept in bounds by according 
participatory entitlements to affected individuals.
46
 What here is called relative 
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overinclusiveness is limited by creating a decision-making context in which the 
substance of stakeholders’ interests is treated as subjective but the intensity of interests 
can be ‘objectively’ assessed. In the liberal pluralist representative ideal underlying the 
multi-stakeholder model, the decision-making process is thus divided in two stages. In 
the first stage, electoral or non-electoral mechanisms of authorization and accountability 
provide stakeholder representatives with mandates that reflect their constituents’ 
subjective interests. In the second stage, stakeholder representatives make final 
decisions on the basis of a deliberative process that takes into account the interests of all 
stakeholders, and specifically ‘objectively’ assesses the relative intensity of the 
conflicting interests of various stakeholder constituencies. In other words, the tension 
between competing stakeholder claims are not solved by stakeholder representatives 
through aggregative mechanisms such as voting, but through deliberative judgements 
based on shared standards of ‘rationality’ and ‘reasonableness’.47 
The ability of global stakeholder democracy to reduce overinclusiveness and 
underinclusiveness, as they have been defined in the previous section, is subject to 
significant limitations because of two reasons. First, its ability to address relative 
overinclusiveness depends on the effectiveness of deliberation as a mechanism for 
producing agreement. As Macdonald acknowledges, deliberation may fail to perform 
this function and decision-making may ultimately have to be based on aggregative 
mechanisms.
48
 Fuzzy citizenship provides an aggregative solution that guarantees 
consideration of intensities even when deliberation fails to produce agreement. 
Second, global stakeholder democracy could result in significant levels of 
underinclusiveness because individuals are represented according to issue areas.
49
 As 
noted above, individuals can be affected not only by the decisions that are actually made 
but also by decisions that could have been made, yet were not made. Restricting the 
activities of agents to specific issues or issue areas, even with broad boundaries, often 
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amounts to narrowing the range of possible options and producing what here is called 
agenda-underinclusiveness. For illustration, consider the example of a NGO with a 
mandate to promote labour rights that has to decide how to allocate a substantial amount 
of funds among a wide range of possible activities, such as providing direct income 
support to workers in need in poor countries, financial and organizational support for 
creating labour unions, child care for working mothers, schooling for child labourers, 
and other tasks. It is conceivable that none of those issue-specific activities would have 
a significant impact on the interests or autonomy of many people with HIV/AIDS in a 
poor country. If so, those people with HIV/AIDS would have no legitimate claim to 
participate in the decisions of that NGO, even though the resources controlled by the 
NGO could make a substantial difference to their quality of life if the funding of health 
care were included on the agenda. This situation is a consequence of an a apriori 
limitation of the range of options available to the NGO.
50
 
By contrast, as noted several times in this article, fuzzy citizenship addresses the 
problem of agenda-underinclusiveness by extending participation in decision-making 
units with an unrestricted agenda rather than an issue-specific mandate – states. But how 
does fuzzy citizenship deal with the forms of power that global stakeholder democracy 
is meant to target, i.e. non-state power exercised by large transnational corporations, 
NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations? States should normally be able to regulate 
non-state actors operating on their territory, and therefore citizens of states should be 
able to affect the decisions of those non-state actors indirectly through their influence on 
state regulatory policy. Elsewhere I have argued that, at least in the case of transnational 
companies, this indirect form of control can fail because of four reasons: regulatory 
competition, collusion between state officials and companies, subversive activities by 
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companies, and state weakness.
51
 If fuzzy citizenship were to ameliorate 
‘accountability’ gaps due to state weakness, it would be only indirectly and in the long 
run. But a fuzzy citizenship regime would probably address competitive deregulation 
more directly: companies would find it more difficult to avoid stringent regulation by 
threatening to shift operations across borders and playing states against each other, if the 
interests affected by those companies were represented in the legislatures of their home 
country and at the same time in a variety of potential host countries. Similarly, collusion 
between companies and officials of host states, and covert subversion of the political 
system of host states, could be reduced if the interests of people in host states were 
represented in the legislature of home state, which would be likely to provide an 
additional, and probably substantial, constraint on company behaviour. 
If agenda-underinclusiveness is a persistent problem for proposals that focus on the 
democratization of issue-specific organizations, we need to examine whether it may be 
less of a problem for institutional models that occupy the third cell of Figure 1, 
specifically world federalism. According to the federal approach, underinclusiveness 
can be reduced by shifting authority over a particular issue area ‘upwards’, i.e. to a more 
encompassing decision-making unit. Similarly, overinclusiveness can be reduced by 
shifting decision-making authority ‘downwards’, i.e. to smaller territorial units that are 
‘nested’ in the larger one. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is often invoked as a criterion 
for allocating authority over policy areas among territorial levels, including in proposals 
for global democratization,
52
 but the principle itself is subject to several alternative 
interpretations, as Andreas Føllesdal has shown.
53
  
The federal approach to minimizing underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness has 
some limitations. The allocation of authority over a certain policy area to a certain 
governance unit results in a restriction of the decision-making agenda for all other 
governance units, at the same or at a different level. This can result in option-
underinclusiveness as well as agenda-underinclusiveness. Option-underinclusiveness 
remains a problem when the choice among the options on the agenda of a given 
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governance unit affects people who are outside of the territorial jurisdiction of that 
governance unit. This can be avoided only if the agenda of governance units were to 
include only options about which it can be said that no one outside the geographical 
boundaries of that unit would be affected by which one among them is chosen. To the 
extent that few policy issues can be circumscribed within neat territorial boxes, 
minimizing underinclusiveness may require the centralization of most or nearly all 
decisions at the most inclusive level, i.e. the global level. 
Agenda-underinclusiveness remains a problem under federal arrangements because 
their proper functioning depends on a relatively stable definition of what is and what is 
not on the agenda of each governance unit, whereas the all-affected principle (at least in 
the version adopted here) applies principally to the determination of the agenda itself. A 
prior and all-inclusive decision on the content of any agenda before votes on any 
options are cast is probably not compatible with most interpretations of federalism as 
system of multilevel governance. 
Federalism is vulnerable to these problems because it lacks some crucial features of 
fuzzy citizenship. Fuzzy citizenship reduces the problem of option-underinclusiveness 
deriving from extraterritorial externalities by overcoming the dichotomy of citizens who 
have a say and non-citizens who have no say at all. By assuming that all, or virtually all, 
choices about the use of scarce resources may have an extraterritorial effect and 
therefore give rise to extraterritorial participatory entitlements, fuzzy citizenship reduces 
underinclusiveness. Crucially, the fuzzy citizenship approach does not achieve this 
reduction in underinclusiveness at the cost of increasing relative overinclusiveness: 
since it assumes that residents are normally affected more strongly than non-residents 
by the decisions of territorial authorities, it maintains that the former should have a 
different, and stronger, citizenship status than the latter. By abandoning the constraint 
that people have to be either citizens or non-citizens of any given governance unit, 
fuzzy citizenship can address option-underinclusiveness and relative overinclusiveness 
more effectively than federalism.  
Fuzzy citizenship also solves the problem of agenda-underinclusiveness that creates 
difficulties for federalism: as indicated in section II, a fuzzy citizenship regime applies 
to multifunctional territorial units whose substantive agenda is not restricted, either by 
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federal rules of competence or by specialized mandates. Full and partial citizens 
participate in determining the agenda as well as in choosing options from that agenda. 
While the substantive agenda of territorial units would not be restricted under a fuzzy 
citizenship regime, there would be some procedural restrictions: as noted above, the 
basic rules of a fuzzy citizenship regime would affect everybody equally, and thus they 
cannot be placed on the agenda of states, which offer unequal participatory entitlements. 
The difference between federalism and fuzzy citizenship is that the former would assign 
to the ‘global’ level of authority a (potentially very wide) range of substantive 
competences in addition to procedural competences, whereas under fuzzy citizenship 
global institutions would focus on the procedural dimension. However, the fuzzy 
citizenship approach has important points of convergence with federalist approaches 
that emphasise the ‘constitutive’ and ‘dispute-resolving’ role of global representative 
institutions.
54
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
   
In contrast to world federalism, fuzzy citizenship does not entail the creation of a global 
government with substantive competences. In contrast to global stakeholder democracy, 
fuzzy citizenship does not require the addition of mechanisms of stakeholder 
representation for thousands of non-state organizations that may affect people’s ability 
to live autonomous lives. As proposals for reducing the global democratic deficit go, 
fuzzy citizenship could even be seen as requiring relatively modest institutional 
adjustments: as noted in the introduction, most states already allow non-residents to 
vote from abroad, and realizing the proposal would essentially entail dropping the 
requirement that those electors must be ‘nationals’ of the state. 
 Of course, matters are not so simple. Before any such institutional adjustments 
become conceivable, let alone feasible, a major conceptual adjustment is required: 
citizenship must no longer be seen as an all-or-nothing affair. This article has argued 
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that, since different states have different impacts on different people, citizenship should 
be differentiated as well. 
 It is easy to develop this kind of arguments in academic journals. Another thing is for 
political entrepreneurs to move from abstract blueprints to programmes for political 
transformation that can attract the support of a broad coalition. Whatever the merits of 
the institutional change proposed in this article, the author of this article harbours no 
illusions that such a supporting coalition is likely to materialize. On the contrary, the 
outlook is certainly not rosy. One key obstacle to any programme for global 
democratization is, of course, the political construction of self-interest. U.S. President 
Lyndon B. Johnson warned in 1966 that ‘There are 3 billion people in the world and we 
have only 200 million of them. We are outnumbered 15 to 1. If might did make right 
they would sweep over the United States and take what we have. We have what they 
want.’55 Johnson was speaking to troops stationed in Korea, and his speech implied that 
Americans had the might as well as the right to keep what they had. Political leaders 
may not always express such views so bluntly, but they are still predominant, and 
cosmopolitan advocates face an uphill battle in persuading the mighty to revise their 
views of what is right.  
 As noted above, the implementation of the fuzzy citizenship proposal would require 
a major conceptual shift in addition to major changes in norms and interests. It would be 
wrong to rule out the possibility of substantial conceptual innovations on the part of 
influential political entrepreneurs, and thus to condemn academic explorations into this 
unknown terrain as entirely futile. Shift happens. One prominent example must suffice. 
If the Founders of the United States had simply accepted what Dahl calls the ‘standard 
view’ until the eighteenth century, namely that ‘representative democracy was a 
contradiction in terms’,56  they would have refrained from designing novel types of 
political institutions aimed to combine mechanisms of representation and political 
equality in a large polity. But instead they asked, as James Madison did in the Federalist 
No. 14, ‘why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it 
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may comprise what is new?’ Madison contrasted the conservative attitude of the critics 
of the proposed Constitution with the forward-looking mindset of the Revolutionary 
leaders, who ‘accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human 
society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the 
globe.’57  
Today, in the light of unprecedented global challenges, attempts at nudging political 
leaders and citizens to engage in the kind of radical institutional imagination displayed 
by the American Founders are as worthwhile as ever. 
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